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INTRODUCTION
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, I now commonly known
as the Haslip case, the Supreme Court of the United States in 1991
addressed for the first time whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution places restraints
on punitive damages awards. 2 Haslip involved a claim of insurance
fraud by an Alabama municipality and its employees against Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Company (Pacific Mutual) and one of its
agents.3 By agreement, the municipality made deductions from its
employees' paychecks and sent to Pacific Mutual's agent premiums
for Pacific Mutual life insurance and group health insurance issued
by another insurer.4 Instead of procuring health coverage, the
agent kept the money, leaving Mrs. Haslip, a municipal employee,
without coverage when she was hospitalized for an illness.5 Mrs.
Haslip and three other municipal employees sued the agent and his
employer, Pacific Mutual. 6 Ajury awarded Mrs. Haslip $1,040,000,
of which at least $840,000 was attributed to punitive damages, more
than four times the amount of compensatory damages and more
than 200 times her out-of-pocket expenses (which amounted to less
than $4,000). 7
The Supreme Court upheld Mrs. Haslip's punitive damages
award, noting that Pacific Mutual knew its agent had previously en-
gaged in an identical "pattern of fraud.' 8 Nevertheless, the Court
1. 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
2. Prior to Haslip, the Court had accepted for review at least two cases in which it was
asked to determine the constitutionality of punitive damages awarded in civil tort cases. In
each case, however, the Court avoided definitive rulings, finding that the parties had not
properly preserved their constitutional challenges for review. See Bankers Life & Casualty Co.
v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 76 (1988) (declining to reach conclusion that excessive punitive
damages award violated due process because claim was not raised or passed upon in state
court); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828-29 (1986) (refusing to address issue of
whether lack of sufficient standards regarding punitive damages awards violated Due Process
Clause of Fourteenth Amendment because Court's disposition of "recusal-for-bias" issue
made it unnecessary to reach due process issue); see also Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276-77 (1989) (stating that issue of whether due process acts as
check on punitive damages awards must "await another day" because issue had not been
raised below or mentioned in petition for certiorari).
3. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1036-37 (1991).
4. Id. at 1036.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1036-37.
7. Id. at 1037 & n.2.
8. Id. at 1041 (noting that Pacific Mutual received several complaints about absence of
coverage purchased through agent).
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emphasized "once again"9 its concern about punitive damages that
"run wild" 10 and indicated that due process puts limitations on pu-
nitive damages awards." The Court declined to express those limi-
tations with precision, but suggested that the punitive damages
award in Haslip, four times greater than Mrs. Haslip's compensatory
damages, was "close to the line" of constitutional impropriety.' 2
As this Article went to press, the Supreme Court was deciding
another case, TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. 13 In that
case, involving the business tort of slander of title, the West Virginia
Supreme Court upheld a $10 million punitive damages award where
Alliance Resources suffered damages of not more than $19,000 for
legal fees. 14 What the Court will do is, of course, mere speculation,
but the Supreme Court's decision to hear the case is further evi-
dence that unbridled punitive damages awards raise untoward
consequences.
The Haslip case itself provides an important impetus for reform of
the common law of punitive damages.' 5 State legislators can and
should be responsive to the confidence vested in them by the Court.
This Article will suggest some areas that are appropriate for reform
in keeping with both the black letter and spirit of the Supreme
Court's decision in Haslip. But first, by way of background, this Art-
9. Id. at 1043; see also Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
280-82 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring, O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (emphasizing potentially devastating and detrimental effect of excessive punitive dam-
ages awards); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (expressing concern for lack of objective
standard limiting punitive damages because possibility of "windfall recoveries" exists); City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270-71 (1981) (warning that punitive damages
awards are often unpredictable and substantial).
10. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1043 (1991).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1046. In the short period since the March 4, 1991 Haslip decision, the Court
has demonstrated its concern about excessive punitive damages awards many times, vacating
and remanding 11 punitive damages cases "in light of Haslip." See Fleming Landfill, Inc. v.
Garnes, 111 S. Ct. 2882 (1991); Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Koire, 111 S. Ct.
2253 (1991); Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Turner, 111 S. Ct. 1678 (1991); InterConti-
nental Life Ins. Co. v. Lindblom, I11 S. Ct. 1575 (1991); International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness v. George, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991); Pacific Lighting Co. v. MGW, Inc., 111 S.
Ct. 1299 (1991); Portec, Inc. v. Post Office, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991); Clayton Brokerage Co. v.
Jordan, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991); Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Eichenseer, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991);
Hospital Auth. v.Jones, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991); Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 111 S.
Ct. 1298 (1991).
13. 419 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 594 (1992).
14. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 877, 890 (W. Va.),
cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 594 (1992).
15. See Ruth Marcus,Justices Reject Limit on Punitive Damages: Ruling, Seen as Consumer Vic-
tory, Appears To Leave Issue with States, WAsH. PosT, Mar. 5, 1991, at Al (discussing how Haslip
leaves issue of limiting punitive damages for state courts to develop); Victor E. Schwartz &
Mark A. Behrens, Haslip May Alter Tort-Claim Strategies, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 17, 1992, at 23 (review-
ing cases that have applied Haslip and suggesting ways in which states should change their
laws through legislation to comport with Supreme Court's guidelines).
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icle will describe the purpose and history of punitive damages, the
political considerations involved in reform, and the respective roles
of legislators and courts in implementing reform.
I. THE PURPOSE AND HISTORY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages are often misunderstood, although much has
been written about them.16 Primarily, confusion exists about the
purpose of punitive damages. 17 Punitive damages are intended to
punish the defendant and deter that individual and others from en-
gaging in similar wrongful conduct in the future.' 8 Generally, puni-
tive damages have nothing to do with "making the plaintiff
whole."' 19 That purpose is served by compensatory damages, which
compensate tort victims for personal injuries and economic losses.20
16. See, e.g., Dorsey 0. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1982) (analyzing legal theories and background supporting punitive dam-
ages liability);John C. Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA.
L. REV. 139, 139 (1986) (assessing "out of control" nature of modem punitive damages
awards); Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from
History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1234-40 (1987) (asserting that Eighth Amendment should
apply to punitive damages awards); Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1173, 1173 (1931) (discussing role of punitive damages in civil liability cases); David G.
Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. Cmtt.
L. REV. 1, 7 (1982) (examining problems and limitations associated with punitive damages
awards in product liability context); David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Product Liability Litiga-
tion, 74 MicH. L. REV. 1257, 1262-99 (1976) (exploring concept of punitive damages and
compatibilities with theories of product liability);James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Puni-
tive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1159-65 (1984) (argu-
ing for abolition of punitive damages concept); James B. Sales, The Emergence of Punitive
Damages in Product Liability Actions: A Further Assault on the Citadel, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 351, 351
(1983) (discussing past and present role of punitive damages); Malcolm E. Wheeler, A Proposal
for Further Common Law Development of the Use of Punitive Damages in Modern Product Liability Litiga-
tion, 40 ALA. L. REV. 919, 921 (1989) (suggesting need for more common law and statutory
development in area of punitive damages); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70
HARV. L. REV. 517, 517 (1957) (engaging in general discussion of punitive damages in tort
law).
17. Cf WILLIAM PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 529 (8th ed. 1988)
(discussing various rationales underlying punitive damages).
18. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th
ed. 1984) (explaining that punitive damages are awarded for purpose of punishing defendant,
teaching defendant not to "do it again," and deterring others from similar behavior); PROSSER
ET AL., supra note 17, at 528-29 (stating that purpose of punitive damages is to punish, admon-
ish, and deter others); see also International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48
(1979) (stating that punitive damages are " 'private fines levied by civil juries to punish repre-
hensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence' ") (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)).
19. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 9 (noting that punitive damages are those "over
and above" full compensation for injuries); PROSSER El AL., supra note 17, at 528 (explaining
that punitive damages are awarded "over and above" compensation for harm); see also Ricn-
ARD L. BLAT-r ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE 9
(199 1) (stating that punitive damages, as compared with other types of damages, are not mea-
sured by party's position before and after wrong).
20. See Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 434 (5th Cir. 1962)
(describing compensatory damages as those that are designed to place injured party in pecu-
niary position equivalent to what he or she would occupy had no tort been committed).
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In personal injury actions, compensatory damages include payment
for out-of-pocket expenses (e.g. lost wages and medical costs) and
awards for "pain and suffering."' 21 Most damages in our tort/liabil-
ity system are compensatory. 22
Punitive damages were developed in the English common law to
serve as an auxiliary, or "helper," to the criminal law system, which
in eighteenth-century England punished property rights infractions
more severely than personal rights infractions. 23 Punitive damages
existed to ferret out and impose a public sanction against antisocial
conduct that was otherwise undeterred by the criminal law.24 In
their origins in England and in America, punitive damages were
confined to a narrow category of claims called intentional torts, such
as assault and battery, libel and slander, malicious prosecution, false
imprisonment, and intentional interferences with property such as
trespass and conversion. 25
In recent years, however, the scope of punitive damages law has
broadened considerably beyond its origins, and its purposes have
become cloudy.26 As a result, the frequency and size of punitive
21. See I MARILYN MINZER ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 1.03, at 1-16 (1992) (not-
ing that included in definition of compensatory damages is compensation for physical and
mental suffering).
22. See id. (stating that compensatory damages are most common form of damages in tort
actions).
23. See Sales, supra note 16, at 355 (asserting that punitive damages were adopted in
England as means by which infractions involving personal harm could be severely punished);
see also Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Magarian, Challenging the Constitutionality of Punitive Dam-
ages: Putting Rules of Reason on an Unbounded Legal Remedy, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 485, 485 (1990)
(stating that punitive damages originally served as "helpful auxiliary to state criminal law").
24. See Samuel Freifield, The Rationale of Punitive Damages, 1 OHIo ST. LJ. 5, 7 (1935)
(suggesting that punitive damages were awarded when civil law branch sought to attain objec-
tives of criminal system); David L. Walther & Thomas A. Plein, Punitive Damages: A Critical
Analysis: Kink v. Combs, 49 MAR.. L. REV. 369, 371 (1965) (noting ways in which punitive
damages were used to "castigate" defendant for "malicious or cruel motives").
25. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 10-11 (listing torts that courts have historically
considered to warrant punitive damages); Ellis, supra note 16, at 14-15 (discussing historic
application of punitive damages awards to victims of torts that "resulted in affronts to [their]
honor").
26. See Michael C. Garrett, Allowance of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Claims, 6 GA. L.
REv. 613, 613-20 (1972) (discussing extension of punitive damages awards into new areas of
law and noting changing theoretical foundations of punitive damages). The size and fre-
quency with which courts awarded punitive damages exploded beginning in the late 1970s
and 1980s primarily because of three significant legal developments in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. First, courts moved away from the basic and understandable application of puni-
tive damages in the area of intentional torts and applied them in the developing field of prod-
ucts liability. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838-42 (2d Cir.
1967) (considering appropriateness of punitive damages in products liability context); Toole
v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 414-18 (Ct. App. 1967) (upholding punitive
damages award against drug company regarding safety of potentially toxic drug); Moore v.
Jewel Tea Co., 253 N.E.2d 636, 648-49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (allowing award of punitive dam-
ages in product liability context where there was evidence of willful and wanton conduct). See
generally Garrett, supra, at 613 (discussing courts' tendency to extend punitive damages awards
to product liability suits). Second, with the advent of "mass tort" litigation, courts permitted
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damages awards have "skyrocketed." 27 "Today," as one respected
commentator in the field has noted, "hardly a month goes by with-
out a multi-million dollar punitive damages verdict in a product lia-
bility case." 28
II. THE POLITICAL BATTLE IN REFORM
When legislatures seek to reform punitive damages law, members
of the organized plaintiffs' bar suggest that such reform is unneces-
sary.29 They argue that there are not enough punitive damages
claims to merit a legislator's attention.30 The debates about the
number of punitive damages awards are rampant, although, as a re-
cent study funded by the plaintiffs' bar's Roscoe Pound Foundation
showed, while estimates can be made, "the actual number of puni-
tive damages awards in products liability litigation is unknown and
possibly unknowable because no comprehensive reporting system
exists." 31
One matter is crystal clear, however; as a General Accounting Of-
punitive damages to be awarded repeatedly for what was essentially a single act or course of
conduct by the defendant. See, e.g., Toole, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 418 (awarding $500,000 in punitive
damages, later reduced by remittitur to $250,000, to individual adversely affected by prescrip-
tion drug MER/29); Ostopowitz v. William S. Merrell Co., N.Y. LJ.,Jan. 11, 1967, at 21 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1967) (awarding $100,000 in similar claim associated with MER/29); Paul D. Rhe-
ingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CAL. L. Rnv. 116,
134-38 (1968) (examining MER/29 cases and their significance in product liability litigation);
see also Jeffries, supra note 16, at 141-42 (discussing Roginsky and considering problem of re-
petitive punitive damages awards); Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Magarian, Multiple Punitive
Damage Awards in Mass Disaster and Product Liability Litigation: An Assault on Due Process, 8 ADEL-
PHIA LJ. 101, 110-12 (1992) (considering due process implications of mass tort litigation and,
specifically, multiple exposure to punitive damages awards for same conduct); Richard A.
Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and
Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 37, 51-55 (1983) (discussing how single act may result in mass
tort litigation and, hence, multiple punitive damages awards). Third, courts began, contrary
to settled law, to permit recovery of punitive damages in contract actions such as breach of an
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d
1032, 1042 (Cal. 1973) (allowing assessment of punitive damages in contract action where
defendant breached implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, but not allowing plaintiff to
recover because of failure to state sufficient facts).
27. Melvin M. Belli, Sr., Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in Present-
Day Society, 49 UMKC L. REV. 1, 1 (1980).
28. Wheeler, supra note 16, at 919, cited in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct.
1032, 1066 (1991).
29. See, e.g., Roxanne B. Conlin, Litigation Explosion Disputed, NAT'L UJ., July 29, 1991, at
26, 26 (discussing recent studies refuting view that excessive tort litigation has become norm);
see also David B. Rottman, Tort Litigation in the State Courts: Evidence from the Trial Court Informa.
tion Network, STATE CT. J., Fall 1990, at 4, 11 (concluding that most tort cases are settled,
withdrawn, dismissed, or arbitrated).
30. See Conlin, supra note 29, at 26 (relying on empirical study indicating that punitive
damages are awarded infrequently). See generally Robert S. England, Congress, Nader, and the
Ambulance Chasers, AM. SPECTATOR, Sept. 1990, at 18 (explicating plaintiffs' bar influence over
Congress through political action committees and campaign contributions).
31. Michael Rustad, Demystifying Punitive Damages in Product Liability Cases: A Survey of a
Quarter Century of Verdicts, 78 IowA L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 1993).
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fice study showed, a huge number of punitive damages awards are
reversed or reduced. 32 This is because there is an absence of guide-
lines on the topic.3 3 Plaintiffs' bar opponents of punitive damages
reform suggest that these reductions and reversals mean that
"everything is all right."3 4 This is not true.
Vague and uncertain punitive damages law has a substantial and
detrimental impact on American industry.35 It undermines confi-
dence in the civil justice system, 36 serves as a significant obstacle to
the settlement process, 37 and handicaps American businesses in
competition with foreign enterprises. 38 Most troubling, uncertainty
about how and when punitive damages awards will be imposed ad-
versely affects the development of new technology. 39 For example,
32. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COMMERCE, CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND COMPETITIVENESS, COMM. ON ENERGY AND COM-
MERCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, PRODUCT LIABILITY: VERDICTS AND CASE RESOLUTION IN
FIVE STATES 38 (1989) (noting that out of 12 punitive damages awards that appellate courts
reviewed, three were vacated and remanded, seven were reversed, and two were affirmed).
33. See Paul M. Barrett, Judicial Disorder: High Court Vagueness on Punitive Damages Leads to
Legal Chaos, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1993, at Al (observing that lower courts have used same
Supreme Court precedent to affirm and limit punitive damages and that Court is revisiting
issue this term).
34. See Robert L. Habush, The Tort System Under Fire: Don't Fix What Ain't Broke, 34 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 119, 122-23 (1987) (discussing study analyzing verdicts and reduction of
judgments).
35. See, e.g., The General Aviation Accident Liability Standards Act: Hearings on S. 640 Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 43-44 (1990) (statement of Robert Martin, coun-
sel, Beech Aircraft Corp.) (describing devastating impact that product liability has had on
aviation manufacturers); SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE & TRANSP., THE GENERAL
AVIATION ACCIDENT LIABILITY STANDARDS ACT OF 1989, S. REP. No. 223, 101st Cong., Ist
Sess. 1-3 (1989) (reporting that in part because of product liability exposure, general aviation
production has declined precipitously since mid-to-late 1970s); see also Cannuli v. Cessna Air-
craft Co., Nos. 80-3285, 81-2209, 89-1052 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 1984) (awarding punitive damages
of $25 million in consolidated wrongful death/product liability litigation case).
36. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM IN
AMERICA 6, 22-23 (Aug. 1991) (commenting that current approach to punitive damages re-
sults in random, capricious, and disproportionate awards).
37. See Aaron D. Twerski, A Moderate and Restrained Federal Product Liability Bill: Targeting
the Crisis Areas for Resolution, 18 U. MIcH.J.L. REF. 575, 612 (1985) ("It is close to impossible to
negotiate sensibly with a plaintiff who believes that he [or she] can shoot for the moon.").
38. See S. REP. No. 215, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1991) ("American manufacturers and
product sellers generally pay product liability insurance rates which are twenty to fifty times
higher than those of foreign competitors. This disparity is attributable in large part to the
uncertainties and costs of the American tort litigation system."); H.R. REP. No. 748, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 24 (1988) ("Without having to absorb the costs of product liability
exposure for most of their sales, foreign corporations have an obvious price advantage. In
Japan and Europe, product liability laws are more stable, litigation less frequent, and large
damage awards uncommon."); cf. U.S.-JAPAN WORKING GROUP, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, STRUC-
TURAL IMPEDIMENTS INITIATIVE 5 (1991) (noting group's expectation that U.S. Government
will institute product liability reform as means to enhance U.S. international business
competitiveness).
39. See PETER W. HUBER & ROBERT E. LrrAN, THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIA-
BILITY ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 7 (1991) (reporting on American Medical Association study
finding that "[i]nnovative new products are not being developed or are being withheld from
the market because of liability concerns or inability to obtain adequate insurance"); see also
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
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the Immune Response Corporation recently halted its work on an
HIV vaccine because it feared unchecked liability such as punitive
damages. 40
The organized plaintiffs' bar tries to focus on the political fight
over "how many cases occur, "41 but this approach misses a funda-
mental point. As the Supreme Court's decision in Haslip stressed,
the issue is fairness.42 Whether there are 100 or 100,000 punitive
damages awards annually, they must be imposed in a fair way in ac-
cord with both the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
III. COURTS VERSUS LEGISLATURES
The organized plaintiffs' bar and some consumer groups have ar-
gued that if changes are to occur in the law of punitive damages,
they should be made by courts, not legislatures. These groups con-
tend that legislatures are really not "qualified" to undertake such
reforms and that the reforms should be made by judges in the com-
mon law process.
It is true that courts should reform this area: the Supreme Court,
as well as sound social policy, demand such action. Indeed, at least
four courts have found state punitive damages systems unconstitu-
tional in light of Haslip.43 As mentioned previously, the Supreme
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing that "the threat of... enormous
awards has a detrimental effect on the research and development of new products"); WALTER
K. OLsoN, THE LITIGATION ExPLosION 7 (1991) (insisting that growth in product liability liti-
gation has driven manufacturers to remove products from market or not introduce them at
all).
40. See Jon Cohen, Is Liability Slowing AIDS Vaccines?, SCIENCE, Apr. 10, 1992, at 168-69
(reporting that fear of liability prompted Immune Response Corporation (IRC) to halt HIV
vaccine research and that halt is especially troubling because IRC's HIV vaccine has out-
performed every other vaccine); cf Brown v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 479 (Cal. 1988)
(discussing withdrawal of Bendectin from market after price increased by more than 300%,
and also noting withdrawal from market of all but two manufacturers of diphtheria-tetanus-
pertussis (DPT) vaccine and price increase from 1¢ per dose to $11.40 per dose to cover
insurance). See generally Bruce N. Kuhlik & Richard F. Kingham, The Adverse Eflects of Standar-
dless Punitive Damage Awards on Pharmaceutical Development and Availability, 45 FOoD DRUG CosM.
LJ. 693, 697-704 (1990) (addressing unfavorable effects of punitive damages on product
availability and pharmaceutical innovation).
41. See, e.g., Conlin, supra note 29, at 26 (discussing low percentage of cases resulting in
punitive damages awards); Habush, supra note 34, at 120-21 (stating that number of tort cases
filed reflects slow growth in tort litigation); Rottman, supra note 29, at 5-6 (providing informa-
tion on volume and composition of tort cases).
42. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1038-39 (1991) (observing
that due process prohibits punitive damages awards that lack" 'basic elements of fundamental
fairness' ") (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276
(1989)).
43. SeeJohnson v. Hugo's Skateaway, 974 F.2d 1408, 1418 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that
in light of Haslip, Virginia's scheme for awarding punitive damages as applied by federal dis-
trict court below violated Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment); Mattison v. Dallas Carrier
Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 99-106 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that South Carolina's punitive damages
system violated Due Process Clause because strict review criteria must be applied in accord-
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Court recently decided to revisit the punitive damages due process
issue.44 A number of courts have made reforms by the common law
process without invoking the Constitution.45 Nevertheless, several
reasons exist why legislatures, as contrasted with courts, are in a
much better position to effectuate sound and effective reform.
First, courts are confined to the narrow issues before them in a
case. If they go beyond those issues, they violate the concept of
dealing with true "cases and controversies. ' 46 These specific, legal-
istic issues, such as whether punitive damages can be awarded when
compensatory damages are not, often miss the forest for the trees.
Second, courts do not have the benefit of learning about the full
extent of the public policy issues that guide sound punitive damages
reform. Unlike courts, whose "view" of a case is generally limited
only to the arguments of two opposing attorneys, legislative com-
mittees have the power to hear from all parties and groups who may
have legitimate interests in punitive damages issues. The ability of
legislatures to call upon a wealth of knowledge and different per-
spectives gives them better insight than courts into the "total pic-
ture." Furthermore, courts' sympathy for particular plaintiffs or
defendants may impede sound reform.
Third, courts, following the common law process, institute their
rules on a retroactive basis. This results in expensive legal costs and
unfairness because people who are potential plaintiffs or defendants
ance with Haslip); Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Assocs., Inc., 596 A.2d
687, 705-12 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (concluding that amount of punitive damages violated
due process, reasoning that $12.5 million punitive damages award surely crossed line that
$840,000 award in Haslip approached), cert. denied, 605 A.2d 137 (Md. 1992); Games v. Flem-
ing Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 904-10 (W. Va. 1991) (announcing that West Virginia's
system for awarding punitive damages violated due process because it did not consider strict
review criteria as required in Haslip); see also Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 648-54
(Md. 1992) (considering Haslip and raising burden of proof for punitive damages to showing
of"actual malice"); Gamble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350, 353-55 (S.C. 1991) (adopting more
detailed postverdict review process to comply with Haslip); Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833
S.W.2d 896, 900-02 (Tenn. 1992) (reforming Tennessee system because of Haslip, through
raised burden of proof, developed review criteria, and tightened standard for assessing puni-
tive damages).
44. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va.), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 489 (1992).
45. See, e.g., Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 574-75 (Haw. 1989) (utiliz-
ing common law to raise burden of proof in claims seeking punitive damages from preponder-
ance of evidence standard to clear and convincing evidence standard); Travelers Indem. Co.
v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 362-63 (Ind. 1982) (proposing new clear and convincing evi-
dence standard as opposed to preponderance of evidence standard when punitive damages
are sought); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 458 (Wis. 1980) (deciding that
burden of proof standard for punitive damages will thereafter be "clear, satisfactory and con-
vincing" standard).
46. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl.l; see also LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrru-
rIONAL LAW § 3-7, at 68 (2d ed. 1988) (describing requirement of Article III of Constitution
that claim must contain "real and substantial controversy" to ensure that courts do not over-
step their authority and offer "advisory opinions").
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need to know the rules in advance. Legislatures can and do behave
proactively, giving the public advance notice of what the rules are.
This notice seems particularly important when the rules at issue re-
late to punishment. 47
In sum, while courts can and should have a role in punitive dam-
ages reform, legislatures can best paint the "big picture." This may
explain why in a footnote in Haslip the Supreme Court pointed to
legislative action in the area of reform.48
IV. KEY REFORMS BASED ON THE LETTER OF HASLIP
A. Establish a Clear and Strong Trigger
Legislators should articulate a clear and strong standard for juries
to apply in evaluating whether a defendant's conduct warrants puni-
tive damages. In Haslip, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he trial
court specifically found the conduct in question 'evidenced inten-
tional malicious, gross, or oppressive fraud.' "49 In light of this lan-
guage, states that allow punitive damages awards for less than
intentional or conscious wrongdoing 50 are vulnerable to due pro-
cess objections, including, for instance, states that permit punitive
damages awards for "gross negligence." 5'
Legislators must remember, as described above, that in its origins
and at the time the Founding Fathers ratified the Constitution, puni-
tive damages were reserved for clearly intentional torts such as bat-
47. A simple example, perhaps, makes the practical point. Controversy exists about
what the maximum speed should be on rural highways. Some say 55 miles per hour, some say
65 miles per hour, or even more. Would anyone propose that the changes regarding maxi-
mum speed be made by courts on a common law basis? Would it be reasonable or prudent to
wait until a case comes before a court, then decide what the maximum speed should be, and
fine a driver for speeding based on that decision? That approach would most likely be consid-
ered outrageous and absurd. Likewise, it is irrational to use the same retrospective system of
common law to devise rules that guide punitive damages.
48. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1046 n.l 1 (1991) (noting that
there is much to be said in favor of state statutes imposing standards of proof for punitive
damages).
49. Id. at 1046.
50. An example of purely "intentional wrongdoing" would be an individual purposely
firing a handgun at a specific person, whereas an example of a "conscious wrongdoing"
would be an individual purposely firing a handgun into a crowd.
51. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 768.73 (1991) (allowing for punitive damages in various civil
actions involving "willful, wanton, or gross misconduct"); TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 41.003 (West Supp. 1992) (stating that exemplary damages may be awarded only if claimant
proves that harm resulted from fraud, malice, or gross negligence); Wisker v. Hart, 766 P.2d
168, 173 (Kan. 1988) (announcing that punitive damages may be awarded whenever element
of malice, fraud, gross negligence, or oppression is involved in controversy); Buzzard v. Farm-
ers Ins. Co., 824 P.2d 1105, 1105-15 (Okla. 1991) (holding that plaintiff must demonstrate
that defendant acted with malice, fraud, oppression, gross negligence, or wantonness to re-
ceive punitive damages).
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tery, assault, trespass, and false imprisonment.52 Sound public
policy suggests that punitive damages be reserved for this type of
egregious conduct.53 The compensatory tort system with its ample
awards, especially for pain and suffering, has developed mechanisms
such as the collateral source rule54 to deter wrongful conduct that
falls short of intentional or conscious wrongdoing.55
B. Instruct Juries About the General Purposes of Punitive Damages
Second, legislators should not allow juries to be given unlimited
discretion in determining whether to award punitive damages. In
Haslip, the trial court stressed the discretionary nature of punitive
damages and described their purpose, which is not to compensate
the plaintiff, but rather to punish the defendant and deter future
misconduct.56 The jury also was told to focus on promoting the
state policies of deterrence and retribution and to consider the char-
acter and degree of the wrong.57 Approvingly, the Supreme Court
noted: "The instructions thus enlightened the jury as to the puni-
tive damages' nature and purpose, identified the damages as punish-
ment for civil wrongdoing of the kind involved, and explained that
their imposition was not compulsory."' 58
C. Establish Detailed Standards for Judicial Review
Third, detailed post-trial standards for judicial review should be
established. In upholding the award in Haslip, the U.S. Supreme
Court stressed the fact that the Alabama Supreme Court had estab-
52. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing traditional category of claims for
punitive damages).
53. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting public purpose of punitive
damages).
54. See generally John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law,
54 CAL. L. REv. 1478, 1478 (1966) (discussing development of collateral source rule and de-
fining it as rule that prohibits defendant from reducing damages based on benefits received by
plaintiff from outside sources such as insurers).
55. See Note, supra note 16, at 523 (recognizing deterrent effect of ordinary negligence
law). As the Note aptly states:
If an act is particularly wrongful, society imposes criminal sanctions in order to
deter the wrongdoer and others from repeating the offense. But while some faults, such
as ordinary negligence, should be discouraged, they do not warrant the stigma and severity of
criminal punishment. Such deterrence is effected in tort law by shifling the loss: the defendant is
forced to repair the harm done to the plaintif.
Id. (emphasis added).
56. See Pacific Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haslip, II S. Ct. 1032, 1037 n.l (1991) (noting trial
court's jury instructions regarding punitive damages awards). The trial court opinion was not
published.
57. Id. The trial court instructed the jury that "[s]hould you award punitive damages, in
fixing the amount, you must take into consideration the character and the degree of the wrong
as shown by the evidence and necessity of preventing similar wrong." Id.
58. Id. at 1044.
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lished post-trial procedures for trial courts to scrutinize punitive
damages awards and had required them to reflect in the record their
reasons for sustaining a jury verdict or for setting it aside on the
ground of excessiveness. 59 As an additional check, the Alabama
court provided a meaningful standard for appellate review of puni-
tive damages awards by first undertaking "a comparative analysis" 60
and then applying detailed substantive standards to ensure that the
award did not "'exceed the amount that will accomplish society's
goals of punishment and deterrence.' "61 As the U.S. Supreme
Court noted: "The Alabama Supreme Court's post-verdict review
insures that punitive damage awards are not grossly out of propor-
tion to the severity of the offense and have some understandable
relationship to compensatory damages." '6 2
In a key footnote, the Supreme Court contrasted Alabama's de-
tailed appellate guidelines with those of Mississippi and Vermont,
where awards are set aside or modified only if they are "manifestly
and grossly excessive" 63 or evince "passion, bias and prejudice...
so as to shock the conscience." 64 The Haslip decision strongly sug-
gests that these and other states with open-ended appellate review
schemes are vulnerable to constitutional attack on the ground that
their review of punitive damages awards is vague and arbitrary, and
therefore violates due process.6 5
59. Id. The Court noted that the factors applied by the trial court included the "culpabil-
ity of the defendant's conduct," the "desirability of discouraging others from similar con-
duct," the "impact upon the parties," and "other factors, such as impact on innocent third
parties." Id.
60. See id. at 1045 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So. 2d 1050, 1053 (Ala.
1987), which required Alabama appellate courts to evaluate appropriateness ofjuries' puni-
tive verdicts by comparing them with other awards allowed in similar cases).
61. See id. (discussing Alabama law and quoting Greer Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d
218, 222 (Ala. 1989)). The U.S. Supreme Court set forth seven factors that the Alabama
Supreme Court applies in reviewing punitive damages awards:
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award
and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that
actually has occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct,
the duration of that conduct, the defendant's awareness, any concealment, and the
existence and frequency of similar past conduct; (c) the profitability to the defendant
of the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and of having the
defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the "financial position" of the defendant; (e) all the
costs of litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its
conduct, these to be taken in mitigation; and (g) the existence of other civil awards
against the defendant for the same conduct, these also to be taken in mitigation.
Id (citing Central Alabama Elec. Coop. v. Tepley, 546 So. 2d 371, 377-78 (Ala. 1989)); Horn-
sby, 539 So. 2d at 223-24).
62. Id
63. See id. at 1045 n.10 (quoting Pezzano v. Bonneau, 329 A.2d 659, 661 (Vt. 1974)).
64. See id. (citing Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So. 2d 254, 278 (Miss.
1985), aft'd, 486 U.S. 71 (1988)).
65. See id at 1046 (holding that Alabama review standards did not violate due process
because they contained specific, objective criteria); see also Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp.,
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D. Shift Focus Away from Defendant's Wealth
The Haslip opinion also suggests that the jury's focus in determin-
ing punitive damages should not be on the defendant's wealth. 66 In
Haslip, the Supreme Court was particularly impressed that Alabama
did not permit the jury to consider the defendant's wealth.67 The
Court stated: "[T]he factfinder must be guided by more than the
defendant's net worth. Alabama plaintiffs do not enjoy a windfall
because they have the good fortune to have a defendant with a deep
pocket."' 68 Although Alabama did allow the defendant's wealth to
be considered for appellate review, this information was not before
the jury.69
Unfortunately, many states make the defendant's wealth a princi-
pal consideration in a jury's determination of the magnitude of pu-
nitive damages to be awarded.70 Legislatures can correct this
prejudicial approach by allowing courts to consider wealth in deter-
mining whether an award is excessive or inadequate, but they
should not allow the "wealth factor" to be paraded before juries.
E. Amount of the Award
As the introduction to this Article suggests, the Supreme Court in
Haslip found a four-to-one ratio of compensatory to punitive dam-
ages to be "close to the line" of being unconstitutional. 7' The
Court made clear that this is an area where states, legislatures in
particular, can do the most good in providing a reasonable and ra-
tional rule for assessing punitive damages amounts. 72 Indeed, rec-
ognizing the need to place reasonable restraints on runaway
947 F.2d 95, 104-05 (4th Cir. 1991) (announcing that South Carolina's punitive damages law
as applied by federal district court violated Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment because
state's punitive damages review procedures were substantially similar to Mississippi and Ver-
mont "excessiveness" standards suggested by Supreme Court in Haslip to be
unconstitutional).
66. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1045 (1992) (commenting
that, under Alabama law, jury must be guided by more than defendant's "net worth").
67. See id at 1044 (approving of jury instructions and noting that "[a]ny evidence of
Pacific Mutual's wealth was excluded from the trial in accord with Alabama law").
68. Id. at 1045.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Rhue v. Dawson, 841 P.2d 215, 229 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that as-
sessment of punitive damages should reflect consideration of defendant's wealth in order to
achieve "appropriate level of punitive effect"); Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348, 1350-53
(Cal. 1991) (en banc) (reasoning that goal of deterrence will only be achieved if defendant
feels financial implication of wrong committed); Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 528 n.6
(Del. 1987) (noting that one factor to be considered in assessing punitive damages is defend-
ant's financial well being).
71. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1046 (1991).
72. See id at 1046 n.l 1 (recognizing that "there is much to be said in favor" of legisla-
tures creating rules regarding punitive damages).
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punitive damages awards, at least one state legislature, North Da-
kota, 73 and two state courts since Haslip have met the Supreme
Court's challenge and focused their actions on the important rela-
tionship between punitive and compensatory damages.
In Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc.,74 the West Virginia Supreme
Court reversed and remanded for new trial a case containing a puni-
tive damages award of $105,000 and no compensatory damage
award. 75 The court held that West Virginia could not allow juries to
award punitive damages without finding compensatory damages. 76
Writing for the court, Justice Richard Neely stated that "[p]unitive
damages should bear a reasonable relationship to the potential of
harm caused by the defendant's actions and that generally means
that punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to actual
damages because compensatory damages provide a reasonable mea-
sure of likely harm." 77
Similarly, in Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander Associ-
ates,78 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals applied the Haslip
guidelines to a punitive damages award imposed against a New York
insurance broker.79 The court held that a $12.5 million punitive
damages award violated due process because it was "out of all pro-
portion to both the harm caused and the perniciousness of the con-
duct."' 0 The court found that the punitive damages award "surely
crosse[d] th[e] line" set forth in Haslip.81
Groups advocating punitive damages reform in recent years have
likewise recommended that punitive damages awards be limited to
some ratio of compensatory damages.8 2 Perhaps the most fair and
73. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(l)-(5) (signed by governor Mar. 31, 1993) (dis-
cussing procedure, criteria, and limitations regarding awarding of punitive damages).
74. 413 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1991).
75. Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 900 (W. Va. 1991). The plaintiffs in
the case alleged that the defendant's solid waste disposal facility constituted a nuisance. Id.
76. Id. at 908.
77. Id. Justice Neely also applauded the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Haslip as "a
major step in the unification of America's decisional law in matters where the separate states
are unable to craft a set of rational rules." Id
78. 596 A.2d 687 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991), cert. denied, 605 A.2d 137 (Md. 1992).
79. See Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander Assocs., 596 A.2d 687, 710
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (comparing punitive damages award with actual harm in light of
Haslip), cert. denied, 605 A.2d 137 (Md. 1992).
80. Id. at 710. The court in Alexander stated that "[n]ot only is the $12.5 million allowed
by the court extraordinary in terms of Maryland history, it is far in excess of the actual harm
caused to Evander, representing nearly fifty times the essentially liquidated compensatory
damage." Id at 711.
81. Id. at 711 ("If the $840,000 awarded in Haslip came 'close to the line' in terms of the
actual loss suffered, this surely crosses that line").
82. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR Assoc., SPECIAL COMM. ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF THE AMERI-
CAN BAR AssoC. SECTION ON LITIGATION, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A CONSTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION
64-66 (1986) [hereinafter ABA REPORT] (recommending that punitive damages awards in ex-
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flexible approach is one developed by the American College of Trial
Lawyers, a group of trial attorneys experienced in representing both
plaintiffs and defendants. This group would limit punitive damages
to twice the amount of compensatory damages or $250,000, which-
ever is greater.83 A similar approach was recommended in a 1991
report by scholars of the esteemed American Law Institute.8 4
Unlike other approaches that use only a ratio tied to compensa-
tory damages to limit punitive damages awards, 85 these proposals
provide the trier of fact with great flexibility to do justice in the rare
situation where a defendant has engaged in heinous conduct with a
huge potential for harm, but which resulted in little actual harm.8 6
In such a situation, the court could assess punitive damages up to
the fixed monetary ceiling (e.g. $25,000 or $250,000) without being
handcuffed to a strict ratio corresponding to compensatory
damages.8 7
cess of three-to-one ratio to compensatory damages awarded be considered presumptively
"excessive"); AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF THE
COMMITTEE ON SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE 13-15 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter ACTL REPORT] (proposing that quantum of punitive damages be limited by relationship to
compensatory damages); AMERICAN LAW INST., ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL IN-
jURY-REPORTERS' STUDY 265-69 (Vol. 11 1991) [hereinafter ALI REPORTERS' STUDY] (arguing
for establishment of numerical ratio between amount of compensatory damages and punitive
damages).
83. ACTL REPORT, supra note 82, at 15. Some states have already adopted limitations
similar to this. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.005 (1991) (confining punitive damages awards
to $300,000 in cases in which compensatory damages are less than $100,000 and to three
times amount of compensatory damages in cases of $100,000 or more); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-03.2-11(4) (signed by governor Mar. 31, 1993) (limiting punitive damages to twice com-
pensatory damages or $250,000, whichever is greater); TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 41.007 (West Supp. 1992) (limiting punitive damages to four times actual damages or
$200,000, whichever is greater).
84. See ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 82, at 258-59 (endorsing concept of ratio cou-
pled with alternative monetary ceiling, "perhaps $25,000," for cases "in which the plaintiff's
harms were minimal even though the defendant's behavior was egregious"). The Reporters
did not recommend a specific ratio of punitive to compensatory damages that states should
adopt. See id. ("Our concern in this Report is to endorse the substantive principle of the ratio
of punitive to compensatory damages, not to commit ourselves to specific judgments about
each of the issues in the operative formula."). See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A.
Behrens, The American Law Institute Reporters'Study on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury: A
Timely Call for Punitive Damages Reform, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming Summer 1993).
85. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(I)(a) (1987) (prohibiting punitive damages
from exceeding amount of compensatory damages awarded); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
240b (West 1991) (limiting punitive awards to twice compensatory damages); COUNCIL ON
COMPETITIVENESS, MODEL STATE PUNITIVE DAMAGES ACT (1991) (limiting punitive damages to
amount of compensatory damages awarded); ABA REPORT, supra note 82, at 64-66 (proposing
three-to-one ratio of punitive to compensatory damages).
86. An example of such conduct is a case where the defendant throws harmful acid at a
person's face but misses, causing only minimal clothing damage. See ALI REPORTERS' STUDY,
supra note 82, at 259 (noting that advantage of ratio principle with flexible formula is ability to
adjust to "special features of individual cases").
87. See Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 902 (W. Va. 1991) (discussing
situation where actual damage is minimal, yet court awards substantial punitive damages as
deterrence measure); Morris, supra note 16, at 1181 (noting that actual result of harm may
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It is important to note that, for due process reasons, any ratio
construct may be challenged in two situations on the ground of ex-
cessiveness: first, in cases where the defendant is being subjected to
repeated punishment for what was essentially a single act or course
of conduct,88 and second, where the case involves a very large com-
pensatory damage award.8 9 In these situations, strict adherence to a
fixed ratio may overemphasize the deterrent effect of the punitive
damages award and thus be excessive. Also, when legislatures act
on these recommendations, it is important they provide both that
juries not be informed of the limit and that juries' awards for puni-
tive damages exceeding the limit be reduced by courts.90 If ajury is
informed of the dollar or ratio limit, the jurors may perceive it as a
guideline for assessing punitive damages, rather than as a ceiling.
V. REFORMS THAT MEET THE SPIRIT OF HASLIP
Legislatures can do more than follow the letter of Haslip; they can
adhere to its spirit. In Haslip, the Supreme Court vested in state
legislators a great challenge to exercise their good judgment and
place reasonable restraints on punitive damages. 9' Three reforms,
at the very least, fit within this category.
A. Burden of Proof
The Haslip opinion suggested that states can improve punitive
damages awards procedure by fostering changes in the common
law.92 For instance, states may change the burden of proof that a
plaintiff must show to establish that a defendant's conduct wanants
punitive damages. In a footnote, the Court noted that "[t]here is
much to be said in favor of a State's requiring, as many do, . . . a
standard of 'clear and convincing evidence.' 93
have little to do with necessary admonition). Opponents of these proposals may argue that
$250,000 is an insufficient punishment in such a case. This argument approaches frivolity
when one considers criminal fine punishments for similar wrongful conduct. See Appendix
(listing examples of state criminal penalties).
88. See Schwartz & Magarian, supra note 26, at 102 (suggesting that imposition of multi-
ple, or repetitive, punitive damages awards for single act or course of conduct by defendant
may offend due process).
89. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 889 n.12 (W. Va.)
(discussing situation where five-to-one ratio would be "excessive" in terms of due process),
cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 594 (1992).
90. See ACTL REPORT, supra note 82, at 15 (reasoning that jury may attempt to circum-
vent limit by increasing amount of compensatory damages).
91. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1046 n.l 1 (1991) (calling
state legislatures to action regarding imposition of burden of proof for punitive damages that
is higher than preponderance of evidence standard).
92. Id.
93. Id.
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The "dear and convincing evidence" burden of proof standard is
the accepted trend in punitive damages law.9 4 Each of the principal
groups to analyze the law of punitive damages since 1979 has rec-
ommended this standard, including the American Bar Association in
198795 and the American College of Trial Lawyers in 1989.96 More
recently, a report issued by the American Law Institute in 1991 rec-
ommended the clear and convincing evidence standard because it
would "signal dearly to juries that there is something special about
a punitive award." 9 7 Approximately half of the states have chosen
to adopt the clear and convincing standard either by legislative ac-
tion 98 or judicial decision.99
The public policy reason for adopting this heightened burden of
94. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (listing states that have adopted clear
and convincing evidence standard).
95. See ABA REPORT, supra note 82, at 19 (suggesting adoption of clear and convincing
standard because standard will "strengthen the hands of judges" to ensure against abuse).
96. See ACTL REPORT, supra note 82, at 15-16 (asserting that clear and convincing evi-
dence standard is more "in harmony" with current punishment system than preponderance of
evidence standard); see also Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,748-49
(1979) (analyzing clear and convincing standard adopted by Uniform Act).
97. ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 82, at 248-49.
98. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-20 (Supp. 1992); ALAsKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (Supp. 1992);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (Michie Supp.
1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-34-2 (Bums 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (West 1987);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(c) (Supp. 1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.184(2) (Baldwin Supp.
1991); MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(5) (1991); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 42.005 (Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(5) (signed by governor Mar. 31, 1993);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(A) (Anderson 1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (1991); OR.
REV. STAT. § 30.925 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-33-135 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); S.D.
CODIFIED LAwS ANN. § 21-1-4.1 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (1992); Miss. H.B. 1270
§ 2(1)(a) (signed by governor Feb. 18, 1993). One state, Colorado, requires proof of punitive
damages liability "beyond a reasonable doubt." COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (1987).
99. See, e.g., Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 680-81 (Ariz. 1986)
(holding that punitive damages are appropriate only upon showing of clear and convincing
evidence of defendant's "evil mind"); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349,
362-63 (Ind. 1982) (employing clear and convincing standard when punitive damages are
sought because standard best furthers public interest of avoiding abuses associated with pun-
ishment); Tuttel v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1362-63 (Me. 1985) (allowing recovery of puni-
tive damages only if plaintiff can prove malice by clear and convincing evidence); Owen-
Illinois v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 655-57 (Md. 1992) (noting that clear and convincing stan-
dard is most appropriate because it ensures that damages are properly awarded); Hodges v.
S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992) (reasoning that clear and convincing
standard of proof is best for punitive damages awards considering dual purposes of punish-
ment and deterrence); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 457-58 & n.23 (Wis.
1980) (adopting "middle burden of proof," which court defines as clear and convincing stan-
dard, as requisite burden for obtaining punitive damages). In Masaki v. General Motors, Inc.,
the Hawaii Supreme Court stated:
[P]unitive damages are a form of punishment and can stigmatize the defendant in
much the same way as a criminal conviction. It is because of the penal character of
punitive damages that a standard of proof more akin to that required in criminal
trials is appropriate, rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard gener-
ally employed in trials of civil actions .... A more stringent standard of proof will
assure that punitive damages are properly awarded.
Masaki v. General Motors, Inc., 780 P.2d 566, 575 (Haw. 1989).
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proof is to alert jurors that they should be more certain of their deci-
sion when they invoke punishment, as contrasted with awarding
compensatory damages.' 0 0 It also alerts trial courts to the fact that
some cases may not appropriately be heard by ajury.' 0 1 Finally, the
clear and convincing evidence standard gives appellate courts power
to review decisions carefully' 0 2 and to ensure that punitive damages
are properly awarded.10 3
B. Bifurcating the Trial
Another means by which legislatures can meet the Supreme
Court's challenge in Haslip to restrain extraordinary punitive dam-
ages awards is through the procedure of bifurcating trials. The bi-
furcation procedure requires a jury, usually at the defendant's
request, to determine punitive damages liability in a separate pro-
ceeding subsequent to its verdict on compensatory damages liabil-
ity. Bifurcated trials are equitable because they prevent evidence
that may be relevant only to the issue of punitive damages, such as
evidence of a defendant's net worth or profits, from being heard by
the jury when it is determining basic liability. 10 4
This reform meets the spirit of the Haslip case and is supported by
the American Law Institute's Reporters' Study,' 0 5 the American Bar
Association,10 6 and the American College of Trial Lawyers. 10 7 Re-
cently, in the first common law decision on this point by a state
100. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, III S. Ct. 1032, 1064 (1991) (O'Connor,J.,
dissenting) (arguing that clear and convincing evidence standard should be required of states
because such standard would "signal to the jury that it should have a high level of confidence
in its factual findings before imposing punitive damages"); Masaki, 780 P.2d at 574 (asserting
that clear and convincing standard will ensure that jury is firmly resolved regarding assess-
ment of punitive damages).
101. See Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1064 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (maintaining that clear and
convincing evidence standard would constrain jury discretion).
102. See id. (alleging that clear and convincing evidence standard would allow for closer
scrutiny of evidence by judges and reviewing courts).
103. See Owens-Illinois, 601 A.2d at 657 (asserting that clear and convincing standard will
further help ensure that punitive damages are correctly awarded).
104. See ALI REPORTERS' STUDY,, supra note 82, at 255 n.41 (positing that potential prejudi-
cial effect of evidence of defendant's wealth is most prominent rationale underlying proposals
to bifurcate punitive damages trials). Evidence of profits is highly prejudicial. A jury that is
informed that a firm made substantial profits from the product at issue could be improperly
influenced to issue a favorable plaintiff's verdict when the case for liability is weak.
105. See ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 82, at 255 n.41 (discussing advantages of pro-
posals to bifurcate trials in punitive damages cases and citing prejudicial evidence of defend-
ants' wealth as predominant reason driving such proposals).
106. See ABA REPORT, supra note 82, at 19 ("Evidence of net worth and other evidence
relevant only to the question of punitive damages ordinarily should be introduced only after
the defendant's liability for compensatory damages and the amount of those damages have
been determined.").
107. See ACTL REPORT, supra note 82, at 18-19 (recommending flexible approach to bifur-
cation in cases where punitive damages are sought).
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supreme court, the Tennessee Supreme Court in Hodges v. S.C. Toof
& Co. 108 held that defendants may move for a bifurcated trial in pu-
nitive damages cases.1 09 The court followed several other states
that had previously made similar changes through court rules or
legislation.' 10
C. Compliance with Regulatory Standards Defense
State legislation should also create a shield against punitive dam-
ages awards in cases where the harm-causing aspect of a product's
design, formulation, inspection, testing, packaging, labeling, or
warning either complied with the requirements of a federal statute
or administrative regulation existing at the time the product was
produced, or received premarket approval or certification by a fed-
eral agency. The American Law Institute scholars who wrote the
Reporters' Study endorsed this concept in no uncertain terms:
We believe that the risk of overdeterrence of socially valuable ac-
tivities through the imposition of tort liability on regulated prod-
ucts and activities merits more widespread recognition of a
regulatory compliance defense....
• . . The strongest case for a regulatory compliance defense
arises when punitive damages are sought. If a defendant has fully
complied with a regulatory requirement and fully disclosed all ma-
terial information relating to risk and its control, it is hard to jus-
tify the jury's freedom to award punitive damages."'
108. 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992).
109. Hodges v. S.C. Toof& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992).
110. Id.; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295(d) (West Supp. 1993) ("The court shall, on appli-
cation of any defendant, preclude the admission of evidence of that defendant's profits or
financial condition until after the trier of fact returns a verdict for plaintiff awarding actual
damages and finds that a defendant is guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud."); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 549.20 (West Supp. 1993) (announcing that evidence of defendants' financial situation
is not admissible in initial proceedings to determine compensatory damages); Miss. H.B. 1270
§ 2(l)(b) (signed by governor Feb. 18, 1993) (stating that trier of fact must first determine
liability for compensatory damages before deciding any issues related to punitive damages);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.263 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (stating that all actions involving punitive
damages shall be heard in bifurcated trials and that evidence of defendants' financial condi-
tion is not admissible in first trials); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7) (1991) (providing
mandatory bifurcation of proceedings in which liability and amount of punitive damages are
determined); NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.005(3) (1991) (stating that separate proceeding will deter-
mine amount of punitive damages subsequent to trier of fact finding liability for punitive
damages); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5(b) (West 1987) (setting out mandatory bifurcation of
proceedings for determining compensatory and punitive damages in product liability actions);
N.D. CErr. CODE § 32-03.2-11(2)-(3) (signed by governor Mar. 31, 1993) (allowing bifurca-
tion at either party's election and prohibiting evidence of defendant's financial condition or
net worth in proceeding to determine punitive damages); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(2)
(1992) (precluding evidence of defendant's financial condition prior to determination of de-
fendant's liability for punitive damages). See generally Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional
Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 320-23 (1983) (promoting
concept of bifurcated proceedings in punitive damages cases).
111. ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 82, at 95, 101.
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The public policy reason for this type of rule is that society wants
to encourage companies to invest in and develop new and useful
products, especially in the area of medicine.' 12 If implemented, the
recommendation would provide a strong incentive for the innova-
tion of pharmaceuticals and medical devices that may otherwise be
withheld because of liability risk. At the same time, a carefully
drafted compliance with standards defense could punish manufac-
turers who intentionally withhold material information from a fed-
eral agency, such as the Federal Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), by subjecting the irresponsible manufacturers to punitive
damages." 3 Such a defense, easily crafted, would be ajewel for re-
sponsible innovators and a "big stick" against those who fail to com-
ply with regulatory rules.' 14 At least five states have already enacted
this type of defense against punitive damages liability for drugs and
medical devices approved by the FDA. 115
112. See HUBER & LrrAN, supra note 39, at 21 (pointing out that recent study by prestigious
Brookings Institution suggests strong need for adoption of compliance with regulatory stan-
dards defense for product designs that meet all applicable regulatory standards); see aLso PETER
W. HUBER, LxABILrrY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 213-15 (1988) (argu-
ing that compliance with licensing and federal standards should provide protection against
punitive damages).
113. It is relevant to note that in all of the controversial product liability medical device
and drug litigation, such as the heart valve and silicon breast implant cases, plaintiffs allege
that the companies failed to provide material information to the FDA. See, e.g., Bravinan v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 984 F.2d 71, 73 (2d Cir. 1993) (considering claim of failure to warn
of problems associated with artificial heart valve); Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F.
Supp. 89, 94-95 (D. Md. 1989) (discussing plaintiff's claim of failure to warn of risks associ-
ated with silicon breast implants); Rosburg v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 226 Cal. Rptr.
299, 305 (Ct. App. 1986) (litigating claim of insufficient warning regarding breast implants).
114. It should be remembered that the use of this type of defense will not shield compa-
nies from compensatory actions because that responsibility will still be determined by the
jury.
115. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-701 (1992) (stating that drug manufacturer or
seller is not liable for punitive or exemplary damages if drug at issue was manufactured and
labeled in accordance with FDA regulations); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5(c) (West 1987) (dis-
allowing punitive damages awards in cases where drug, device, or food that caused harm was
approved or licensed by FDA or is "generally recognized as safe and effective" pursuant to
FDA regulations); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(c) (Anderson 1991) (prohibiting liability
for punitive damages if drug manufacturer produced product within terms of approval or
license by FDA); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.927(1) (1991) (preventing punitive damages awards in
cases where drug manufacturer produced and labeled drug in accordance with FDA regula-
tions, or where drug "generally is recognized as safe and effective" pursuant to FDA condi-
tions); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2 (1992) (barring punitive damages where drug was
approved or licensed by FDA or is "generally recognized as safe and effective" under FDA
regulations). Very recently, two federal courts of appeals have recognized the strong public
policy behind a compliance with FDA standards defense, finding a medical device manufac-
turer immune from all liability for damages, compensatory and punitive, where the medical
device received FDA premarket approval. See Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1421-
22 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding plaintiff's state tort claims preempted by FDA Class III regulations
because state law constitutes requirement different from, or in addition to, FDA requirement
and relates either to safety or effectiveness of device or any other matter in FDA requirement
applicable to device); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1132-37 (1st Cir. 1993) (analyz-
ing plaintiff's claims and concluding that all claims are preempted by FDA regulations).
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Haslip issued a challenge to state
legislatures to provide reasonable guidelines in the area of punitive
damages in hopes of stopping the irresponsible and devastating
trend toward punitive damages "run wild." 116 The Court may fur-
ther clarify its position in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp. 117 Even if the Court provides more detailed rules, they will be
constitutional guidelines at best. Only state legislatures have the
power, resources, and skills to develop guidelines that meet both
the letter and spirit of Haslip. State legislators can and should meet
that responsibility.
116. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (detailing Supreme Court's challenge).
117. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing TXO Production).
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APPENDIX
EXAMPLES OF STATE CRIMINAL PENALTIES
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Title and Section
in the District of
Columbia Code Description Fine
Assault or threatened
assault in a menacing
manner
Bribery
Perjury
Unlawful entry on
property
Penalties for theft
Penalties for fraud
not more than $500
not more than $25,000 or 3 times the
monetary equivalent of the thing of
value, whichever is greater
not more than $5,000
not more than $100
not more than $5,000 for 1st degree;
not more than $1,000 for 2nd degree
For first degree fraud-
not more than $5,000 or 3 times the
value of the property, whichever is
greater, if the value of the property is
$250 or more; not more than $1,000 if
the value of the property is less than
$250.
For second degree fraud-
not more than $3,000 or 3 times the
value of the property, whichever is
greater, if the value of the property is
$250 or more; not more than $1,000 if
the value of the property is less than
$250.
ILLINOIS
Title and Section
in the Smith-Hurd
Illinois Annotated
Statutes Description Fine
Assault
Battery
Theft
Health care benefits
fraud
not to exceed $500
not to exceed $1,000
not to exceed $1,000 on property
valued at $150 or less; not to exceed
$10,000 or the amount specified in
the offense, whichever is greater, on
property valued at more than $150
or theft of a firearm
not to exceed $1,000
§ 22-504
§ 22-712
§ 22-2511
§ 22-3102
§ 22-3812
§ 22-3822
38 12-1
38 12-3
38 16-1
38 17-8
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Criminal trespass to
land
Perjury
Bribery
not to exceed $500
not to exceed $10,000 or the
amount specified in the offense,
whichever is greater
not to exceed $10,000 or the
amount specified in the offense,
whichever is greater
MARYLAND
Title and Section in
the Annotated Code
of Maryland (1957) Description Fine
Art. 27, § 12
Art. 27, § 23
Art. 27, § 35B
Art. 27, § 36
Art. 27, § 173
Art. 27, § 209
Art. 27, § 342
Art. 27, § 439
Art. 27, § 576
Assault with intent to
rob
Offering bribe to or
receiving bribe by
public officer; witness
in prosecution
Abuse or neglect of
vulnerable persons
Carrying or wearing
concealed weapon;
carrying openly with
intent to injure
Fraud-Conversion
of partnership money
Fraud-Receiving
premiums after insol-
vency
Theft
Perjury
Trespass on posted
property
incarceration only
not less than $100, not more than
$5,000
not more than $5,000
not more than $1,000
not more than $5,000
not more than $500
a value of $300 or greater shall re-
store property to owner or pay the
value of the property or services and
be fined not more than $1,000; a
value of less than $300 shall restore
property to owner or pay him the
value of the property or services and
be fined not more than $500
incarceration only
not exceeding $500
19931
38 21-3
38 32-2
38 33-1
1387
1388 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
MICHIGAN
Title and Section in
Michigan Statutes Annotat-
ed Description Fine
Penal Code § 28.276(1) Assault without weap- not more than $500
on and infliction of
serious injury without
certain intent
Penal Code § 28.313 Bribe not more than $5,000
Penal Code § 28.371 Embezzlement not more than $100t if valued
at $100 or under; not more than
$5,000 if valued at more than
$100
Penal Code § 28.588 Larceny not more than $2,500 if value of
property stolen exceeded $100;
not more than $100t if prop-
erty stolen valued at $100 or
less
Penal Code § 28.594 Larceny by conver- not more than $2,500 if value of
sion or embezzlement property exceeded $100; not
more than $100t if property
stolen valued at $100 or less
Penal Code § 28.664 Perjury committed in incarceration only
courts
Penal Code § 28.815 Willful trespass not more than $100t
Penal Code § 28.824 Wage discrimination not more than $100t
t Penal Code § 28.772 provides that the monetary punishment for a misdemeanor,
when not fixed by statute, is not more than $100.
NEW YORK
Title and Section
in New York
Consolidated Laws Description Fine
Penal Law § 120.00
Penal Law § 120.05
Penal Law § 120.10
Penal Law § 140.10
Penal Law § 140.15
Penal Law § 140.17
Assault in the third
degree
Assault in the second
degree
Assault in the first de-
gree
Criminal trespass in
the third degree
Criminal trespass in
the second degree
Criminal trespass in
the first degree
not exceeding $1,000
not exceeding the higher of $5,000,
or double the amount of D's gain
from commission of the crime
not exceeding the higher of $5,000,
or double the amount of D's gain
from commission of the crime
not exceeding $500
not exceeding $1,000
not exceeding the higher of $5,000,
or double the amount of D's gain
from commission of the crime
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Penal Law § 155.25
Penal Law § 155.40
Penal Law § 155.42
Penal Law § 170.15
Penal Law § 185.05
Penal Law § 190.05
Penal Law § 200.00
Penal Law § 200.03
Penal Law § 200.04
Penal Law § 210.05
Penal Law § 210.10
Penal Law § 210.15
Petit Larceny
Grand Larceny in the
second degree
Grand Larceny in the
first degree
Forgery in the first
degree
Fraud involving a se-
curity interest
Issuing a bad check
Bribery in the third
degree
Bribery in the second
degree
Bribery in the first
degree
Perjury in the third
degree
Perjury in the second
degree
Perjury in the first de-
gree
not exceeding $1,000
not exceeding the higher of $5,000,
or double the amount of D's gain
from commission of the crime
not exceeding the higher of $5,000,
or double the amount of D's gain
from commission of the crime
not exceeding the higher of $5,000,
or double the amount of D's gain
from commission of the crime
not exceeding $1,000
not exceeding $500
not exceeding the higher of $5,000,
or double the amount of D's gain
from commission of the crime
not exceeding the higher of $5,000,
or double the amount of D's gain
from commission of the crime
not exceeding the higher of $5,000,
or double the amount of D's gain
from commission of the crime
not exceeding $1,000
not exceeding the higher of $5,000,
or double the amount of D's gain
from commission of the crime
not exceeding the higher of $5,000,
or double the amount of D's gain
from commission of the crime
TEXAS
Title and Section
in Vernon's Texas
Codes Annotated Description Fine
Penal Code § 22.01
Penal Code § 30.05
Penal Code § 31.03
Penal Code § 32.21
Penal Code § 32.34
Penal Code § 32.41
Assault
Criminal Trespass
Theft (includes em-
bezzlement)
Forgery
Fraud in Insolvency
Issuance of Bad
Check
not to exceed $10,000
not to exceed $3,000
not to exceed $500 if value of prop-
erty stolen is less than $20; not to
exceed $1,500 if value of property
stolen is $20 or more but less than
$200; not to exceed $3,000 if value
of property stolen is $200 or more
but less than $750; not to exceed
$10,000 if value of property stolen
is at least $750 but less than
$20,000
not to exceed $10,000
not to exceed $3,000
not to exceed $500
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Penal Code § 32.45 Misapplication of Fi-
duciary Property
Penal Code § 36.02 Bribery
Penal Code § 37.02 Perjury
not to exceed $3,000 if value of
property is less than $200; not to
exceed $10,000 if value of property
is $200 or more
not to exceed $10,000
not to exceed $3,000
VIRGINIA
Title and Section
in the Code of Virginia Description Fine
§ 18.2-57 Assault and battery not more than $2,500
§ 18.2-95 Grand larceny (includes not more than $2,500
embezzlement)
§ 18.2-96 Petit larceny not more than $2,500
§ 18.2-119 Trespass not more than $2,500
§ 18.2-181 Issuing bad checks not more than $2,500
§ 18.2-204 False statement for the pur- not more than $500
pose of defrauding indus-
trial sick benefit company
§ 18.2-434 Perjury not more than $2,500
§ 18.2-449 Bribery not more than $100,000
WEST VIRGINIA
Title and Section
in the West
Virginia Code Description Fine
Malicious or unlawful as-
sault; battery
Entry of building other
than dwelling
Grand and petit larceny
Obtaining money, property
and services by false pre-
tenses
Obtaining or attempting to
obtain goods, property or
service by false or fraudu-
lent use of credit cards or
other false or fraudulent
means
Publication of false adver-
tisements
Making, issuing worthless
check
Trespass in structure or
conveyance
not exceeding $500
not exceeding $100
not exceeding $500
not more than $1,000
not more than $500
not more than $100
not more than $100
not more than $500
§ 61-2-9
§ 61-3-12
§ 61-3-13
§ 61-3-24
§ 61-3-24a
§ 61-3-38
§ 61-3-39a
§ 61-3B-2
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Computer fraud
Perjury
Bribery
Publication of false state-
ment as to financial condi-
tion of person, firm or cor-
poration
not more than $10,000
not more than $1,000
not more than $5,000
not more than $1,000
1993]
§ 61-3C-4
§ 61-5-3
§ 61-5-7
§ 61-3-37
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